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Bryan: Appellate Review of a Trial Judge's Disposition of a Motion for N

NOTES
APPELLATE REVIEW OF A TRIAL JUDGE'S DISPOSITION
OF A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
"Trials by jury, in civil causes, could not subsist now, without power,
somewhere, to grant new trials."' In 1757, Lord Mansfield thus acknowledged the importance of the power of courts to grant new trials. It
would be difficult to underestimate the importance of that power. The
frequency with which motions for new trials are currently entertained
in Florida indicates that the exercise of this power by the trial courts,
under the safeguards of proper appellate review, is attended by an increasing awareness of its importance as an instrument of justice. In recent years a dichotomy appears to have arisen concerning the trial
court's disposition on the motion. The dichotomy is embodied in two
rules: the broad discretion rule, and the substantial competent evidence
rule. The purpose of this note is to examine the appellate review of a
trial court's disposition of a motion for new trial in light of this dichotomy, as evinced in a number of recent Florida cases.
The note is concerned mainly with motions for new trial in civil
actions at law. Criminal actions and applications for rehearing in equity
are treated only inferentially. This is not to say that the latter are wholly
outside the scope of this note, for many of the observations set forth
herein are equally applicable to equity actions and criminal cases. No
attempt will be made to define "broad discretion," even though the term
has been buffeted about considerably in our courts; rather, it is contended that certain limitations-in particular the substantial competent
evidence rule-imposed by appellate decisions and appellate attitudes
on the exercise of this power at the trial level may be profitably
scrutinized.
I-hSToRCAL NoTE

Since it was not customary to report decisions on motions at early
common law, the genetic development of the practice of entertaining
2
these applications remains locked in the obscurity of ancient times.
As the custom of reporting these decisions grew, and the power of
trial courts to grant new trials gained wider and more substantial
recognition, it became apparent that the power to grant new trials had

1. Bright v. Eynon, 1 Burr. 890, 393, 97 Eng. Rep. 865, 366 (K.B. 1757).
2. Queen v. Bewdley, 1 P. Wins. 207, 213, 24 Eng. Rep. 857, 359 (Ch. 1712).
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developed independently of statutes of authorization; 3 consequently,
applications therefor were addressed to the sound discretion of the
4

court.

A great deal has been said about the trial court's duty to grant a new
trial when justice so requires. Indeed, a great responsibility is reposed
in the trial judge's supervision of his court. It is generally felt that the
trial judge has complete control over the decorum and orderly management of trials before him.6 The jury has always been considered as
functioning with significant dependence on the trial court: 6
[The jurors] are not, and never have been, independent of the
court of which they are a part, but their verdicts must meet the
approval, or at least they must not offend the sense of justice, of
the presiding judge, who, as the late Justice Crier, of the
[S]upreme [C]ourt of the United States, was fond of saying, was
by virtue of his position "the thirteenth juror."
The principles which govern the application for new trial in Florida
support the control exercised by 'the presiding judge at the trial level, as
well as the basic proposition that a motion for new trial is primarily for
the purpose of directing the attention of the trial judge to errors committed at the trial. Thus the administration of justice may be facilitated
by allowing the judge to correct such errors without subjecting the
parties to the expense of appeal, and speedy relief may be given the
injured party by awarding him a new trial.7 The principle that an appellate court will not review questions upon which the trial judge has
not passed is not open to doubt.8 Consequently, a motion for new trial
is necessary if the trial court has not had an adequate opportunity to
pass upon the question. 9 It, therefore, forces a decision by the trial judge
on each question upon which appellate review will be sought. 10 A mo-

3. Jon-am, TmIwAS m APsPA 481 (1957).
4. E.g., Cloud v. Fallis, 110 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1959); Pyms v. Meranda, 98 So.
2d 341 (Fla. 1957); City of Miami v. Bopp, 117 Fla. 532, 158 So. 89 (1934); Warner
v. Goding, 91 Fla. 260, 107 So. 406 (1926); Aberson v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 68
Fla. 196,67 So. 44 (1914).
5. See 32 FLA. Jun. Trial §§16-23 (1960).
6. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Yeatts, 122 F.2d 350, 353 (4th Cir. 1941).
7. Kahn v. Delaware See. Corp., 114 Fla. 32, 153 So. 308 (1934); Florida E.
Coast By. v. Hayes, 67 Fla. 101, 64 So. 504 (1914); Massey v. State, 50 Fla. 109, 39
So. 790 (1905); see generally 39 Amr. Jur. New Trial §17 (1942). See also CnANDALL, FLORIDA COMION LAw PRACTICE §482 (1928).
8. Chomont v. Ward, 103 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1958); Green v. Parmelee, 134 Fla.
289, 183 So. 726 (1988); Mizell Live Stock Co. v. J. J. McCaskill Co., 59 Fla. 822,
51 So. 547 (1910); Kelly v. Kaufman, 101 So. 2d 909 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
9. CnANDA.L, FLORIDA CoImmON LAW PRACTIcE §480 (1928).
10. Vassar v. State ex rel. Gleason, 139 Fla. 213, 190 So. 434 (1939) citing with
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tion for new trial is, of course, not the only post-judgment remedial
device designed to accomplish this end; but it is frequently encountered
and is made almost as a matter of course in most cases in which an
appeal is contemplated. It is an absolute requisite to appellate review
if the sufficiency or probative force of the evidence is challenged, or if
there is a contention that the verdict is excessive. 1'
It is undisputed in Florida that any application for a new trial is
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. 1 2 It has repeatedly
been held that only a clear abuse of this discretion, resulting in an injustice, will warrant an appellate court's reversing the disposition made
upon the application by the trial court.' s
The trial court has not only the right and the power, in its discretion,
to grant a new trial, but also the duty to do so when the ends of justice
have not been served. This imposes upon the trial court a considerable
responsibility which must be exercised with great care and deliberation.
The trial judge cannot refuse to entertain and decide motions for new
trial; he must exercise his discretion or he will be depriving the movant
4
of a substantial right, and such deprivation will be corrected on appeal.'
If, then, we are to allow the trial judge to review a case in his own court
with a view to correcting errors which may have occurred therein, it
would seem that an almost plenary license is to be afforded him. It is
within the province of 'the jury to determine disputed questions of fact,
but if the verdict reached does not square with right and justice, it is
within the province of the trial court to set the verdict aside and grant
a new'trial.' 5
In Pyres v. Meranda,16 the Florida Supreme Court has acknowledged
that the trial judge is better positioned than any other person to comprehend fully the processes by which the ultimate conclusions of the jury
are reached. This conclusion is predicated upon his contact with the
trial itself, his observations of the behavior of those upon whose testimony the findings of fact are necessarily based, and his opportunity to
approval CRANDALL, FLomDA COMMON LAw PRACTICE §480 (1928); Seaboard Air
Line Ry. v. Anderson, 73 Fla. 1, 73 So. 837 (1917).
11. Jarkesy v. Daniels, 58 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 1952); St. Andrews Bay Lumber Co.
v. Bernard, 106 Fla. 232, 143 So. 159 (1932); Red Top Cab & Baggage Co. v. Grady,
99 So. 2d 871 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
12. See, e.g., Woods v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 100 Fla. 909, 130 So. 601
(1930), and cases cited in note 4 supra.
13. See, e.g., Dent v. Margaret Ann Super Mkts. Inc., 52 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1951).
14. Tampa Water Works Co. v. Mugge, 60 Fla. 263, 53 So. 943 (1910).
15. Florida Publishing Co. v. Copeland, 89 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1956); see generally
66 C.J.S. New Trial §202 (1950). See also Bowe v. Butler, 133 So. 2d 347 (3d
D.C.A. Fla. 1961), in which the court said that if the trial judge feels that substantial
justice has not been done, he should grant a new trial.
16. 98 So. 2d 341 (Fla. 1957).
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assess the impact of the evidence and other influences upon the jury.
The Florida Supreme Court has gone even so far as to state that the
decision of a trial judge in granting a new trial will seldom be reversed
by an appellate court. 7 It is easy to see how such a pronouncement
could be deemed desirable in the light of an attempt to settle the law in
this area and to establish feasible grounds for legal prognostication. We
shall presently investigate such attempts in order to see how desirable
such a solidification might prove to be.
LImTATIONS UPON BROAD

DISCRETnON

n

GENERAL

Our judicial system has never seen fit to allow the trial court the
plenary license suggested above. It would be deemed improvident to
suggest that appellate review of a trial judge's disposition of an application for a new trial should be subject to such constraint as to afford virtually no appeal from such disposition. Lack of effective appeal in this
instance might, in effect, result in a deprivation of the right to trial
by jury.
The Florida constitution provides that the right of trial by jury shall
be secured to all and remain inviolate forever.' 8 This guarantee means
not merely that the right shall not be abolished or wholly denied, but
that it shall not be impaired 9 and must not be flagrantly invaded by
judges.2 0 It has been held in Carney v. Stringfellow2 ' that the right to
have 'the trial judge review the verdict with reference to the evidence
is consistent with the right to jury trial, because the granting of a new
trial merely gives the right to present issues to another jury for the
correction of any injustice; the court merely removes one jury and gives
another a chance to arrive at a different result. However, it is submitted
that this reasoning is unsound. When the trial judge grants a new trial
to a litigant he must necessarily set aside a jury verdict that in some way
favors the other party. The trial court has the inherent power to order
a second or third new trial as well.22 Theoretically, there is no limit to
the number of new trials that may be ordered, other than that imposed
by common sense. The trial judge could therefore become a tyrant and
in effect, superimpose a trial by the court upon the result reached by the
jury, since jury verdicts in his court would have to conform to his notion of justice in any given instance. Whether the trial judge is inclined
17. Duboise Constr. Co. v. City of South Miami, 108 Fla. 362, 146 So. 833

(1933).
18. FLA. CONsT. Decl. of Rights, §3.
19. Flint River Steam Boat Co. v. Roberts, Allen & Co., 2 Fla. 102 (1848).
20. Bessent v. Board of Bond Trustees of Special Rd. & Bridge Dist. No. 1 of
Alachua County, 92 Fla. 292, 109 So. 597 (1926).
21. 73 Fla. 700, 74 So. 866 (1917).
22. See Gulf Power Co. v. Rigby, 113 Fla. 739, 152 So. 23 (1934).
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to be dictatorial or not, his conclusion that the jury verdict should be
set aside and a new trial granted is, no doubt, basically motivated by
simple disagreement with the verdict and a sincere concern in insuring
that justice is done. Thus he may disagree with the verdict because, for
example, he feels that it does not comport with the manifest weight of
the evidence, or that it may be based on erroneously admitted prejudicial
evidence or instructions. In any event, insofar as the verdict is set aside
or modified, such disposition necessarily smacks of the writ of attaintone of the ancient, though decidedly barbarous, common-law fore23
runners of new trials
There is a far more palatable reason that the trial judge's disposition
of a motion for new trial is consistent with the right to trial by jury than
the reason advanced in the Carney case. It is in the safeguard of appellate review that we find a sure protection of the jury system, and the
members of the reviewing tribunal should be keenly aware of their role
in fostering this protection. A very real danger could result if, unwittingly and in the name of justice, appellate review were constrained too
severely by a constant reluctance to overturn the trial court's order
granting or denying a new trial.
We are faced, -then, with the problem of recognizing, on a practical
as well as a theoretical level, the need for appellate courts to have a
broad power to review trial courts' dispositions of motions for new trial
-a power which they should not hesitate to exercise. On the other hand,
there is a palpable need for appellate courts to recognize the broad discretion vested in trial courts and the responsibility that should be accorded trial judges in granting or denying a motion for a new trial.
Tim SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE RUE

Along with the continued reaffirmation in a wealth of Florida cases
of the basic proposition 'that a motion for new trial is addressed to the
broad discretion of the trial court, and the recognition that his ruling
thereon will be upset only upon a clear showing that he has abused this
discretion, another basic rule has evolved. It provides that if substantial
competent evidence appears in the record in support of the verdict
rendered, the verdict should stand, and the trial judge is without authority 'to set it aside and substitute his own conclusions therefor.2 4 It is
interesting to trace the genesis of this rule in the Florida courts.
23. Implicit in this analysis is the feeling that the trial judge causing the writ of
attaint to issue at common law also was usually motivated by the need to satisfy
justice in the particular case before him, even though the consequences attendant
upon such writ were especially harsh by modem standards.
24. E.g., Poindexter v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 56 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1951);
Martin v. Stone, 51 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1951); Hart v. Held, 149 Fla. 38, 5 So. 2d 878
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The notion that an application for a new trial is properly addressed
to the sound discretion of the trial court was firmly established in the
case of Schultz v. Pacific Ins. Co. 25 and remained substantially unchanged until 1987. In that year the Florida Supreme Court decided the
case of Seaver v. Stratton.2 6 In the Seaver case, the court reconfirmed
the broad discretion of the trial court in setting the verdict aside and
granting a new trial, but went on to hold that it constituted "an abuse of
discretion to grant a new trial when the verdict finds ample support in
27
the record and no illegal evidence is shown to have gone to the jury:
It is singularly significant that no authority is proffered in support of
this conclusion.
The substantial competent evidence rule gained further ground in
Hart v. Held,28 in which the court, after bare mention of the "sound
29
judicial discretion" rule, went on to say:
It is settled law that if there appears in the record substantial
competent evidence in support of 'the verdict rendered, the same
should stand and the trial court is without authority at law to
substitute his conclusions based on the evidence for the views and
conclusions of the jury impanelled and sworn to try the controverted issues of fact. . . It is errorto grant a new trialwhen the
verdict set aside is supported by the testimony appearingin the
record and nothing can be accomplished except to have another
jury review the cause.
In support of this "settled law" the court cited Seaver v. Stratton.
The italicized language in the Hart case above begins to sound very
much like an independent legal principle. Almost identical words were
repeated in 1951 in Martin v. Stone,3 0 and the ultimate development of

(1941); Seaver v. Stratton, 133 Fla. 183, 183 So. 835 (1937); Grand Assembly of
Lily White Security Benefit Ass'n v. New Amsterdam Gas. Co., 102 So. 2d 842
(2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
25. 14 Fla. 73 (1872). "The rule which should govern a court in the exercise
of this power [to grant new trials] should be a fair view of the justice of the particular
case, the character of the conflicting testimony, and the surrounding circumstances
. . .and wherever it appears to the court that there is difficulty in reconciling the
verdict with the justice of the vase, and the manifest weight of evidence, there the
court should not .. .withhold its power. This is the rule which should govern the
judge of the court presiding at the trial, who has the same opportunity as the jury to
observe what occurs in the trial." 14 Fla. 73, at 94.
26. 183 Fla. 183, 183 So. 335 (1937).
27. Id. at 188, 183 So. at 337. (Emphasis added.)
28. 149 Fla. 33,5 So. 2d 878 (1941).
29. Id. at 44, 5 So. 2d at 882. (Emphasis added.)
30. 51 So. 2d33 (Fla. 1951).
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the rule seems to have been reached in Jordan FurnitureCo. v. Goggans.3: Such language has enjoyed substantial currency in our Florida
courts in the last decade.3 2 And so, two inconsistent rules come to coexist, more or less peacefully, in our law-both purporting to answer the
same question. On the one hand, it is error to set aside a verdict supported by substantial competent evidence and grant a new trial; on the
other hand, the trial judge has broad discretion in passing on a motion
for a new trial, and, if the verdict, in his opinion, is contrary to the
manifest weight and probative force of the evidence and the justice of
the cause, he actually comes under a duty to grant a new trial. The latter
rule has also been concurrently reconfirmed by the Florida courts in the
33
last decade.
TRm REco

rmoN OF

Two RuLis

The development of the dichotomy resulting from the application of
the two inconsistent rules culminated in Labruzzo v. Atlantic Dredging
& Constr.Co.,34 in which the court frankly recognized that two different
rules had been followed. What seems to have happened is that appellate
courts in some instances have felt the need to maintain rather close
supervision of trial courts insofar as the disposition of applications for
new trial is concerned. We have previously noted a substantial and
reasonable need for extensive powers of appellate review in this area.
The only avenue open to the appellate courts necessitated an inroad
upon broad discretion. Former limitations upon broad discretion do not
appear to have borne much fruit from the standpoint of clarifying the
law.3 5 From these attempts to limit and define broad discretion, however, it is to be concluded that the appellate courts are unwilling to
recognize the same quantum of broad discretion in every instance. They
31. 101 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 1958).
32. See, e.g., Jordan Furniture Co. v. Goggans, 101 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 1958);
Martin v. Sussman, 82 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 1955); Poindexter v. Seaboard Air Line By.,
56 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1951); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Helwig, 108 So. 2d 620 (2d
D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
33. See, e.g., Ward v. Hopkins, 81 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 1955); Mead v. Bentley, 61
So. 2d 428 (Fla. 1952); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Burquest, 101 So. 2d 828 (2d
D.C.A. Fla. 1958). For a more extended treatment of the material presented in this
section see the opinion of Associate Judge Stephenson in Cloud v. Fallis, 107 So.
2d 264,266-68 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
34. 73 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 1954).
35. The limiting decisions and rules have been equivocal and vague. See, e.g.,
Albert v. Miami Transit Co., 154 Fla. 186, 17 So. 2d 89 (1944); Holstun v. Embry,
124 Fla. 554, 169 So. 400 (1936). See also CARSON, FLORmA Commox LAw PLEADING PRACTICE AND P.RocEDURE 283 (rev. ed. 1940). The courts in other jurisdictions
have faced the same problems and have met with substantially the same quantum of
success. 66 C.J.S. New Trial §200 (1950); see, e.g., Whalen v. Brodkey, 189 Iowa
1255, 179 N.W. 513 (1920).
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are faced with the need to recognize a broader discretion in some
instances than in others.
The tendency has been to look upon the substantial competent evidence rule as a test to be applied by the trial judge when granting or
denying a motion for new trial, rather than as a limitation upon the
broad discretion rule. In some cases the rule has been used in effect as a
substitute for broad discretion. This tendency has been fostered at all
levels by the constant urge for legal certitude. The difficulty is that we
are not only left with two rules, but with a very real dilemma at the
trial level. When and upon what grounds is it safe for a trial judge to
grant a motion for a new trial? The attorney, making the motion is, in
the last analysis, confronted with the same dilemma. The lawyer is
faced with having to estimate his chances of success at any given stage
of the proceedings. Forced into prognostication at each turn of events,
he must be able'to rely upon reasonably settled rules of law. Perhaps the
feeling was that the broad discretion rule was simply too nebulous and
the attempts to limit its application too equivocal for it to be of much
utility. The theory of stare decisis demands a certain amount of solidarity; its purpose is to settle the law within finite areas. It would appear, then, that the substantial competent evidence rule was created to
make this area of the law more definite. It may well be doubted whether
it has had such an effect.
THE ADVENT OF CLOUD V. FALus

Realizing the dilemma implicit in the Labruzzo analysis, the Florida
Supreme Court saw an excellent opportunity to resolve it in Cloud v.
Fallis.3 6 In that case, a parent sued for the wrongful death of his threeyear-old son who had been fatally injured by the alleged negligence of a
motorist. The defendant motorist alleged contributory negligence on the
part of the parents in permitting the child to play in the street unattended. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant. Upon plaintiff's
timely motion for a new trial, the judge, recognizing that the issues of
negligence and contributory negligence were questions for the jury,
stated, nevertheless, that he believed the verdict of the jury was contrary to "the manifest weight of the evidence" and in such a circumstance, it was his "duty to grant a new trial." He thought it had been
conclusively shown that the defendant was passing at an excessive rate
of speed through a "thickly populated area, which he knew had in it
many children." The judge felt that the jury had held the parents to a
greater degree of responsibility for the supervision of their child than
required by law.
36. 107 So. 2d 264 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
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Upon review, the Second District Court of Appeal extensively examined cases cited in support of the contentions of each party, and,
while trying to locate the boundaries of the trial judge's discretion, the
court was forced to confess frankly that "there appears to be . . . clear
authority to affirm the trial judge . . . and authority just as clear to
reverse." 37 Relying heavily on Pyms v. Meranda,3 8 the district court of
appeal affr-ned. In Pyms, the Florida Supreme Court, after reconfirming
the "broad and liberal discretion" rule, had observed that the trial judge's
decision to grant a new trial would not be disturbed unless there was a
clear showing of abuse. The rule there announced stated flatly that
when "a trial judge is of the view that a verdict fails to comport with
the manifest weight of the evidence it is actually his duty to grant a new
trial..
. ."31 The court reasoned that the trial judge is in a much better
position than an appellate court to pass upon the ultimate correctness of
the jury's verdict.
4°
The Florida Supreme Court granted certiorari in Cloud v. Fallis
upon the basis of petitioner's claim that the decision of the Second
District Court of Appeal conflicted with 'the decisions of the Florida
Supreme Court in Hartv. Held,41 Martin v. Stone,42 and JordanFurniture Co. v. Goggans, 3 on the same point of law, namely, the test which
should determine the propriety of a trial judge's order granting a new
trial. The petitioner contended that the court below was wrong in failing
to accept and apply the substantial competent evidence rule. The issue
of the case, as framed by the supreme court, was "whether the so-called
'broad discretion' rule or the so-called 'substantial competent evidence'
rule should be applied by an appellate court when judging the correctness of an order of a trial court granting a motion for a new trial."44 After
reviewing the cases cited in behalf of both parties, the court made an
attempt to dispel the confusion arising from the co-existence of both
rules, and to restate the law on the subject.
Justice Thomas, speaking for the court, had stated there was no need
for two rules. But in the court's restatement of the law, it did not go so
far as to overrule the cases (such as Hart v. Held), cited in support of
the substantial competent evidence test. Instead, the court cited with
approval numerous decisions in support of the broad discretion rule
and, also relying on the Pyrs case, approved the decision of the district
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Cloud v. Fallis, 107 So. 2d 264, 269 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
98 So. 2d341 (Fla. 1957).
Id. at 343.
110 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1959).
149 Fla. 33,5 So. 2d 878 (1941).
51 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1951).
101 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 1958).
Cloud v. Fallis, 110 So. 2d 669, 671 (Fla. 1959).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1963

9

NOTES
Florida Law
Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1963], Art. 3

court. The court held that when the judge concludes that the verdict is
against the manifest weight of the evidence, it is his duty to grant a new
trial, and he should always do so if the jury has been deceived as to the
force and credibility of the evidence. In upholding the broad discretion
of the trial court, a certain amount of equivocation was involved, in spite
of the apparent attitude of the court that the question was to be permanently settled. An examination of several subsequent decisions reveals
that some doubt may still exist in this area.
PosT-CLoD

DECISIONS

The Florida courts have faced the problems adjudicated in the
Cloud decision on numerous occasions since that case appeared. The
scope of this note vill not permit an analysis of all the cases subsequent
to the Cloud case; but from an examination of the cases in general and
an analysis of two or three in particular, some useful observations may
perhaps be drawn.
If the Cloud case supposedly settled the law in this area, it did not
remove the problems faced by an appellate court; it did not do away
with the need to recognize limitations upon the trial judge's discretion
at the appellate level. The result was that the district courts continued
to apply the substantial competent evidence test to reverse a trial judge's
45
order granting a motion for new trial.
Later in 1959, the same year in which the Cloud decision was rendered, the Florida Supreme Court entertained the case of McAllister
Hotel, Inc. v. Porte.46 At its initial hearing, the court affirmed, per
curiam, the order granting a new trial, holding that the circuit judge
did not abuse his sound judicial discretion. The court based its ultimate
judgment on Cloud v. Fallis47 and the principles announced therein.
Justice Drew, dissenting, said that the Cloud case dealt solely with
-the question of the power of the trial court to grant a new trial on the
ground that the verdict was contrary to the evidence, and that no such
finding was made by the trial court in this case. A rehearing was granted
and the supreme court reversed the trial court and remanded the case
with instructions to enter a judgment on the verdict. Justice Drew, now
speaking for the court, reiterated the distinction between Cloud and
the instant case. He concluded that the trial judge erred in deciding
45. See, e.g., Gaetano v. Grand Union Super Mkts., Inc., 180 So. 2d 626 (3d
D.C.A. Fla. 1961); Carter v. Duval Eng'r & Contracting Co., 128 So. 2d 143 (1st
D.C.A. Fla. 1961); Price v. Jordan, 115 So. 2d 444 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959); Lyons v.
Grappo, 112 So. 2d 46 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1959), applying the substantial competent
evidence test and citing Hart v. Held, supra note 41.
46. 123 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 1959).
47. 110 So. 2d669 (Fla. 1959).
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that the jury had reached its verdict through mistake and that the verdict
was, therefore, contrary to the justice of the cause. Commenting that
there was no way to know what transpired in the minds of the jurors or
what their mental processes were in arriving at the questioned verdict,
48
Justice Drew went on to say:
Surely there is no way to determine that they arrived at their
verdict by mistake or misconceived the issues ... The record
in this case and the recordand decision in its previousappearance
in this Court amply sustain the verdict. This being true and no
substantial rights of the plaintiff in the trial court having been
violated, the action of the trialjudge in granting a new trial is a
clear abuse of judicialdiscretion.
It was held, 'then, that it is an abuse of discretion to grant a new trial
when the verdict finds ample support in the record. But it has been held
to be the rule in this state that, although it is the province of the jury
to determine disputed questions of fact, it is the duty of the trial court
to set the verdict aside and grant a new trial if it does not square with
right and justice and there is reasonableground to conclude that the
jury acted through mistake.49
Whether or not we are in complete agreement with Justice Drew's
analysis of the case, it would seem that the strong approval with which
the Pyrs case was treated in Cloud would lead us to conclude that the
trial judge in this case should have been accorded a broader discretion
than that which appears to have been accorded him. He is, after all,
"better positioned than any other one person fully to comprehend the
processes by which -theultimate decision of the triers of fact, the jurors,
is reached." 5
In Mow v. F.P. Sadowski Corp.,3 ' the plaintiffs were awarded a substantial verdict in a personal injury action, and the defendants moved
for a new trial. In granting the motion, the court limited the issues to
the question of damages, being "of the opinion that the verdict in favor
of the Plaintiff, Elizabeth Mow, is excessive but it is impossible for the
judge to fix and determine a proper amount of remittitur." In spite of
their recognition of the broad discretion of a'trial judge in acting upon a
motion for a new trial (citing the Cloud case), the district court of
appeal reversed, holding that it could not be said the excessiveness of the
verdict "clearly appears from the record in 'this case."
48. 123 So. 2d 339, at 344 (Fla. 1959). (Emphasis added.)
49. Florida Publishing Co. v. Copeland, 89 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1956). See also
Bowe v. Butler, supra note 15.
50. Cloud v. Fallis, 110 So. 2d 669, 678 (Fla. 1959), citing Pyrns v. Meranda,
98 So. 2d 341 (Fla. 1957).
51. 122 So. 2d 46 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1960), cert. denied, 131 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1961).
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What might have been a valid distinction in McAllister Hotel is
completely inapplicable in the Mow case. Granting a motion for new
trial on the grounds of excessive damages necessitates a finding by the
trial court that the verdict does not comport with the manifest weight
of the evidence,5 2 and a challenge of the verdict for inadequacy stands
in exactly the same position.5 3 It will be remembered that the ground
for granting the new trial in Cloudv. Falliswas the failure of the verdict
to comport with the manifest weight of the evidence.
On petition for certiorari,5 4 the Florida Supreme Court, in a four-tothree decision, determined that the petition was without merit and
dismissed it. The petitioner had contended that the holding in Mow was
in direct conflict with Cloud v. Fallis. Justice Roberts, speaking for the
three dissenting justices, felt that the Cloud case had at least established
'the rule that the appellate court must find that the trial judge abused his
discretion before it can upset his order granting a new trial; whereas the
rule applied in the instant case was that the appellate court could reverse
the trial judge "upon finding some substantial competent evidence to
support the verdict, a principal [sic] specifically rejected in Cloud v.
Fallis." 55 We have seen that 'the trial judge cannot avoid passing on a
motion for new trial; 56 when the probative force of the evidence is
challenged, the judge must weigh that evidence. Would the trial judge
have granted a new trial unless he felt, upon weighing the evidence to
the best of his ability, that the verdict was excessive? It is important to
realize that the trial judge has 'the entire trial as a vivid occurrence before him, and he must determine whether justice has been done in his
court. More than mere power inheres in the exercise of his discretion; he
has a fundamental responsibility to see that the jury's verdict comports
with the manifest weight of the evidence. Reliance upon the cold words
of the record, withdrawn into a foreign atmosphere, could well breed a
lack of sufficient awareness at the appellate level of the broad judicial
discretion so wisely invested in the trial courts of our judicial system.
The judge "must be presumed to have drawn on his talents, his knowledge and his experience to keep the search for the truth in a proper
channel. . .. 57
In Jacksonville Expressway Authority v. Bennett,58 a condemnation
proceeding in which the jury returned a comparatively small verdict for
52. Jarkesy v. Daniels, 58 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 1952).
53. Breitbart v. State Rd. Dep't, 116 So. 2d 458 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1959) and
authorities cited therein.
54. F. P. Sadowsld Corp. v. Mow, 131 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1961).

55. Id. at 5.
56. See text at note 10 supra.
57. Cloud v. Fallis, 110 So. 2d 669, 678 (Fla. 1959). (Emphasis added.)
58. 124 So. 2d 307 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
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the owners, the trial judge granted the owner's motion for a new trial.
The grounds specified by the court in ordering the new trial were that:
(1) The award of compensation by the jury was less than the estimate of
just compensation filed by the petitioner with its declaration of taking;
(2) the verdict was so inadequate as to shock the conscience of the
court; and (3) it did not constitute just compensation. The First District
Court of Appeal, after rather cursory mention of the well-settled principle that such orders carry with them a presumption of validity and will
not be reversed without a clear showing of abuse of discretion, reversed
the trial court's order granting the new trial. In so doing the court found
that the verdict "was within the limits of the evidence and is supported
by substantial competent evidence. The trial court should set aside a
jury verdict only when it is apparentthat it is not supported by substantial competent evidence... ."59 Relying on Hartv. Held,the court went
on to hold it "an abuse of discretion to grant a new trial when the verdict
finds ample support in the record and no illegal evidence is shown to
have gone to the jury and nothing can be accomplished except to have
another jury review the cause. ... 60
A petition for certiorari was granted(' based on the claim that there
was a direct conflict between this holding and Cloud v. Fallis. The
Florida Supreme Court quashed the opinion of the district court, reannouncing and relying on the rule of Cloud v. Fallis.The important
thing about the instant case is that, in what would seem a completely
forthright case involving a palpable contradiction of the Cloud case,
two justices dissented, claiming that the First District Court of Appeal,
"clearly followed the rule prescribed by this court in Cloud v. Fallis."
The dissenting justices also sought to limit the discretion of the trial
court by characterizing it as a particular type-a "judicial" discretion. "It
does not follow that because a judge may be shocked by a jury's verdict
that his actions in setting it aside must necessarily involve the exercise
of judicial discretion."6 2 The dissent suggests that the judge may be
shocked and yet the quantum of injustice shocking him may not be
enough to permit the exercise of his judicial discretion. But the conclusion seems inescapable that, if judicial discretion is to be effectively
recognized, it should not only be recognized when the case calls for a
fine weighing of the evidence, but also when the injustice of the verdict
is manifest.
In Heymann v. Fusco,63 another case of an inadequate award of
damages by the jury, the trial judge granted the plaintiffs a new trial,
19. Id. at 813. (Emphasis added.)

60. Ibid.

61. Bennett v. Jacksonville Expressway Authority, 131 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 1961).

62. Id. at 746.

63. 132 So. 2d 216 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1961).
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specifying in his order that he found "no competent evidence in the
record of the Trial of this cause to support the verdict returned by the
Jury. .. :'The district court sought an examination of the record6 4 and
concluded that "the jury had ample evidence before it to justify its
verdict." 6 The practical effect of this holding is that a judge may find a
verdict contrary to the weight of the evidence, and yet the appellate
court, upon review, may examine the record and find substantial competent evidence supporting it.
One judge, relying on Cloud v. Fallis,dissented "because the appellant has failed to demonstrate that the trial judge, who has broad discretion in ruling upon a motion for new trial, has clearly abused that
discretion." 06
The Florida Supreme Court granted certiorari,6 7 again on the ground
of conflict with previous decisions, and the decision of the district court
was approved. The court noted that the trial judge had felt that there
was "no competent evidence" to sustain the verdict, although the
district
68
court had found "ample evidence" to sustain it. The court said:
We do not find in the trial judge's observation a strong enough
conviction to cocoon his ruling with a discretion impervious to
examination and upset by the reviewing tribunal. In effect he
disagreed with the jury but his view was not so strong as to stamp
the verdict as 'shocking' or 'manifestly against the weight of the
evidence' or as possessing any such equivalent characteristic as
would require 'the exercise of a soundly- discretionary act to
thwart rank injustice as distinguished from the view, formed in
this case and gathered from conflicting testimony, that the verdict
should be something more than $168.00 or $412.80 and something
less than $5,000.
The language and attitude implicit in this excerpt has a marked
similarity to that of the dissenting opinion in Bennett v. Jacksonville
Expressway Authority. The court's attitude toward the relationship between judicial discretion and the act of ordering a new trial is particularly alarming. Although seeming to avoid the issue implicit in the trial
court's order and the opinion of the district court, that is, whether there
was "no competent evidence" or "ample evidence" to sustain the verdict, the court here seems to be saying that they simply doubt the trial
64. The court cited FLA. STAT. §59.07(4) (1961) which provides that no other
grounds than those specified by the trial judge in his order granting a new trial will
be considered on appeal.
65. 132 So. 2d 216, 218 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1961).
66. 132 So. 2d 216, 218 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1961) (dissenting opinion).
67. Fusco v. Heymann, 139 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1962).
68. Id. at 690.
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judge's finding is a strong enough predicate upon which to ground an
order granting a new trial.6 9 Seemingly, a certain quantum of injustice
must exist before the trial judge should feel justified in granting a new
trial, and its existence must be apparent to the appellate court.
Discretion, it is urged, should not have to wait upon manifest and
rank injustice. The very nature of judicial discretion implies an ability
to make decisions that represent a responsible choice, and for which an
understanding of what is lawful, right, or wise should be presupposed.
When faced with a motion for new trial, the trial judge must necessarily
exercise his discretion. His ruling, in any event, is the product of that
discretion and should be accorded the recognition that it proceeds not
only from a sense of justice and responsibility, but from intimate contact
with the trial itselL 70
The supreme court has again reviewed these problems in Russo v.
Clark,7 1 granting certiorari because of petitioner's contention that the
decision of the Second District Court of Appeal,7 2 reversing an order of
the trial judge granting the motion of the defendant for a new trial, conflicted with the supreme court cases of Cloud v. Fallis and Bennett v.
Jacksonville Expressway Authority. In the Russo case, the trial judge
granted the motion because he felt that the verdict was so grossly excessive as to shock the judicial conscience, and he indicated that he
thought the jury was influenced by passion, prejudice, sympathy, and
other matters outside the evidence. The district court examined the
record, found no evidence of excessiveness, and reversed the order
granting the new trial.
73
The supreme court quashed the decision of the district court.
Justice Thomas, speaking for the court, found that the district court had
merely reevaluated the testimony, matching its judgment, based on the
record, against the judgment of the trial court, founded not only on the
record but also on the experience gained at the trial.
Seven months later, however, the supreme court reconsidered this
case on rehearing and receded from the original opinion. In what appears to be a compromise per curiam opinion in which only four justices
concurred, it was acknowledged that an order of a trial judge granting a
69. Cf., Leavstrom v. Muston, 119 So. 2d 315 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1960), in which
the appellate court again was unconvinced that the trial court's conviction that the
verdict should stand was a strong enough predicate upon which to ground an order
denying a new trial.
70. But see Scott v. Andrews, 140 So. 2d 128 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1962), wherein
the district court of appeal reversed an order denying a new trial upon highly conflicting evidence.
71. 147 So. 2d I (Fla. 1962).
72. Clark v. Russo, 133 So. 2d 764 (2d D.G.A. Fla. 1961.)
73. Russo v. Clark, supra note 71.
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new trial is entitled to great weight and should not lightly be overturned
by the reviewing court. No attempt was made to distinguish such orders
on the basis of the grounds specified therein for granting the motion as
was done in the McAllister Hotel case. The writ of certiorari was discharged because the supreme court seemed to feel that the district
court's examination of the record was within its province, and its determination that the trial judge had abused his discretion in granting
the new trial was justifiable. Merely because the verdict shocked the
conscience of the trial judge did not make his ruling impervious to review. The rule now appears to be that it is reversible error to grant a
motion for new trial when the verdict is supported by substantial compe74
tent evidence appearing in the record.
RIUNmATIONS IN

SumARY

Conclusions largely having been drawn in the body of the text above,
this section is offered merely in recapitulation. The final conclusion, and
one not to be denied, is that the substantial competent evidence rule,
which met with ostensible disapproval in Cloud v. Fallis, appears, for
better or worse, to have found its way back into the law. What could
have been a death blow in the Cloud decision has been virtually emasculated. If we are to recognize the broad discretion of the trial court, we
must also recognize a concomitant responsibility-an ability to make
decisions that represent a responsible choice, and for which an understanding of what is lawful, right, and wise must be presupposed.
The so-called broad discretion rule affords at best a nebulous criterion for the trial judge. At the outset of this note it was said that no
attempt to define broad discretion would be made. Indeed, the concept
defies definition in this context. But no one will deny that it has been
severely limited by restrictive appellate decisions and the attitudes they
reflect.
The Florida courts do not uniformly recognize such discretion in the
trial judge as will allow him to respond to matters that will not appear of
record-the kind of discretion exercised, reviewed, and approved in
Pyms v. Meranda.Rather, broad discretion is sometimes accorded great
recognition and, at other times, is hardly mentioned, depending on the
appellate courts attitude in a particular case. Although this situation is
unsatisfactory, whether the objectives of the court in the Cloud case are
wholly desirable may well be doubted.
We must recognize that both *thebroad discretion rule and the substantial competent evidence test have a place in the law. It would be a

74. See Baley v. Sympson, 148 So. 2d 729 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1963).
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mistake to consider the substantial competent evidence test a substitute
for the broad discretion of the trial judge. If there is substantial competent evidence in support of a jury verdict it still remains for the trial
judge to pass upon the relative value of that evidence. The weight of
the evidence cannot appear in the record.
It is submitted that the substantial competent evidence test, as applied, is a limitation upon the trial judge's discretion. But in the last
analysis it is a highly undesirable limitation, because it denies the trial
judge -the power to consider his experience, knowledge, and intimate
rapport -with the trial itself which form the very basis for broad discretion. The logical justification for the current application of the substantial competent evidence test must rest on an unarticulated premise that
the record will reflect everything occurring at the trial level. Careful
analysis reveals that the real conflict between the two rules is only in
their current application, and not in their respective purposes. They
actually exist on two separate planes. The substantial competent evidence rule refers to the relative presence or absence of evidence in the
record, while the purpose of the broad discretion rule is to allow the
trial judge to weigh and assess the evidence adduced, in the light of a
myriad of unrecorded factors.
It is nearly impossible to escape the conclusion implicit in this
analysis that, in the situation wherein a trial judge has awarded a party
a new trial on the grounds that the verdict is excessive or fails to comport
with the manifest weight of the evidence, it is wrong for an appellate
court to reverse and ground its reversal on the presence of substantial
competent evidence appearing in the record in support of the verdict.
Perhaps, for purposes of appellate review, the trial judge ought to express his response to intangible-that is, unrecorded-matters in his order
granting a new trial. But neither will this solution eradicate the basic
problem, for it is subject to abuse. It would put a premium on verbal
adroitness in judges' orders and would soon degenerate into the use of
tried and proven verbal formulas.
Even the casual observer must confess that the present situation in
Florida leaves something to be desired. The Florida Supreme Court has
had to review by way of certiorari too many cases within too brief a
period. The jurisdiction based upon conflicts found between district
court cases and supreme court precedents has been overworked. Apparently no recognition has been accorded the fact that there is no
general rule that is suited to all cases. A delicate balance is involved at
the appellate level. The reviewing jurists must satisfy themselves that a
fair trial has been had, giving great weight in the process to the trial
judge's finding that there has been no such trial. And they must at the
sametime adhere to the principle that the rights of the litigants to a fair
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trial must not be expanded to permit continual submission of the same
issues to different juries.
The problem seems to have found at least subconscious acknowledgment in the reluctance of appellate courts to abandon inconsistent rules.
The observation that decisions purporting to settle the law have met
with little success cannot be ignored. Perhaps the law should be settled.
But rigid formulas must be avoided lest the law in this area attain an
axiomatic quality. Attempts to settle the law must not overcome the
need for a certain elasticity; otherwise what should be a fluid concept
will be forced to masquerade as settled law.
For lawyers and trial judges, on the other hand, some gauge by
which to assess and prognosticate is a "consummation devoutly to be
wish'd." In order to fulfill this goal, three basic but inextricably interlocked questions must be answered. First, when should a trial judge
grant a new trial? Second, when will his ruling be upset on appeal?
Third, when will he be considered to have abused his broad discretion?
The law should be settled at least to the extent that these basic problems
are accorded open recognition. Application for certiorari to the Florida
Supreme Court has been overworked; therefore, a petitioner's chance of
success in the future is extremely uncertain. It is hard to overlook the
feeling that review of a judge's disposition of a motion for new trial
should be contained at the intermediate level of appellate review.
The trial judge, then, is presently left in a dilemma. On the one hand,
he has the duty to grant a new trial if the verdict, in his opinion, is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence; on the other hand, he must
not invade the province of 'the jury by an unwarranted granting of new
trials. But how can the right, and even the duty, be denied him to reexamine the evidence and the trial, as a whole with a view to seeing that
substantial justice has been done and any error corrected?
One may validly wonder whether we have not returned to the point
at which tvo rules are again to be applied as recognized in the Labruzzo
and Cloud cases. Perhaps the cycle has begun anew, and we will witness
again what we have seen in the past. But probably this will not happen.
On the other hand, we may have to learn to live with a dichotomy that is
antagonistic to basic principles of stare decisis and positive law, and that
serves no useful purpose other than to allow a certain fluidity in the law
whereby appellate courts have broad powers enabling them to reverse
or affirm a trial court, depending on their evaluation of the record of the
case before them. Possibly the situation as it stands at the appellate level
should be recognized as useful and desirable.
No answers to the questions nor solutions to the problems set forth
herein are to be found in these pages. But no just answers will be found
without a conscious awareness and recognition of these problems.
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